
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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS TYLER DIVISION	
3	CORE WIRELESS LICENSING	DOCKET 6:12CV100
4	S.A.R.L.	 AUGUST 1, 2014
5	VS.	9:32 A.M.
6	APPLE, INC.	 TYLER, TEXAS
7		
8	VOLUME 1 OF 1, PAGES 1 THROUGH 46	
9	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE BENCH TRIAL	
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN D. LOVE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE	
11	UNITED STATES HASTSTAATE SUDGE	
12		
13	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: J. WE WARD	ESLEY HILL & SMITH LAW FIRM
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24		TATE STREET DN, MA 02109
25		



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3
              (OPEN COURT, ALL PARTIES PRESENT.)
 1
2
                                       Ms. Morris, you may
              THE COURT: All right.
3
   call the case.
              DEPUTY CLERK: The court calls Case
4
5
   Number 6:12cv100, Core Wireless versus Apple.
6
              THE COURT: Announcements.
7
              MR. BUNSOW:
                           Good morning, your Honor.
                                                        Wesley
   Hill and Henry Bunsow on behalf of Plaintiff Core
8
9
   Wireless.
10
              THE COURT:
                          Good morning.
11
              UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Good morning, your
12
   Honor.
13
              MR. ALBRITTON:
                               Good morning, your Honor.
14
              Eric Albritton and Joe Mueller for Apple.
15
   We're ready. Along with us is (indiscernible), in-house
16
   counsel for Apple.
17
              THE COURT:
                          All right.
                                       Thank you.
              UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
18
                                      Good morning, your
19
   Honor.
20
              THE COURT:
                          Good morning.
21
                          Well, we're here -- I wanted to --
              All right.
22
   in light of -- as the course of this case has developed,
23
   at various times I've discussed with counsel issues
   related to these RAND -- how the RAND interaction between
24
25
   the parties occurred and what the parties' positions are
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with regard to that and RAND rates, RAND royalties.

We've discussed that at various times during the course of the litigation.

It was brought into more focus to some degree, although perhaps less focused perhaps in some ways, by the letter briefing procedure. There were a number of letter briefs devoted to what the court should do with this issue or that issue related to contractual obligations and RAND rates and how that all -- all that interaction should take place as far as the court making determinations.

I determined that I was not going to make those -- determine those issues as a matter of summary judgment, leading to a question that I had and that I wanted to explore with the parties. We've discussed at various times how these issues should be resolved, what a jury would resolve, what perhaps the court's role would be, discussed that at various times and, as I say, brought into greater focus in some respects by the letter briefing procedure.

I wanted to go ahead and discuss, before this case got too far down the road to trial, the possibility of the court making some determinations, appropriately of course, not taking away anything from the jury but making appropriate determinations which, A, might help the

parties get to a resolution in this matter; B, might make the trial more streamlined and straightforward for the parties and for the jury.

Obviously what I've received from the parties preceding today is one party taking the position, Core, that a bench trial would be appropriate in certain respects, Apple taking the position that it would not be. So, we don't have agreement on it. I understand that. I think part of my questions today will be what do I do, if anything, with that disagreement.

So, I wanted to ask some questions; and then I may have some follow-up orders on things I'd like the parties to submit to me for my review as this case gets closer to trial.

So, I don't need any sort of -- I've read your briefs. I don't need anything along those lines, but I'm going to ask some questions. And if any of the parties would like to say anything before we get started -- I don't know. Any change of position, anything like that before I delve into questions, Mr. Bunsow?

MR. BUNSOW: No, your Honor. I just agree with you. I think the thinking on this has been evolving not only in this case but in a lot of other cases.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BUNSOW: This issue is present in a lot of

6 1 other cases. 2 THE COURT: Right. 3 And what we submitted to you MR. BUNSOW: Sunday night is our latest. Thank you. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 6 Mr. Mueller, anything you'd like to say? 7 MR. MUELLER: Not right now, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, I guess let me 8 9 ask Apple. Mr. Mueller, why don't you go ahead and go to 10 the podium and just let me ask you a few questions. 11 And, again, this is just an exploration of --I've explored this several times with you, I know. 12 Ι 13 don't want to beat a dead horse; but it is a, I think, 14 evolving process as far as how the courts handle this, 15 what's appropriate, what's not. And, so, this is just 16 kind of, I think, educating for me and for probably you 17 guys as you look at these things in this case and perhaps other cases. 18 19 So, let me ask this, Mr. Mueller. understand from the brief you submitted Apple's position 20 21 is that Apple does not believe that what I wanted to 22 explore today -- that is, the possibility of a bench 23 trial on certain, just as kind of an umbrella catchall phrase, RAND rates, RAND issues, perhaps contractual 24 25 obligations, that type of thing, would not be

appropriate.

Now, my question to you, Mr. Mueller, I guess, first has to do with the concept of could the court give you -- what becomes apparent to me in reviewing these materials that the parties continue to submit is this is very important. I don't want to say -- it's determinative in some respects, I think. Maybe not. But I'll say the importance of it that keeps being advanced and argued and put front and center makes me think that this is very important.

So, would some determinations from the court be helpful in, A, helping you and Core settle the matter? I mean, it's possible that this could turn out very favorable to Apple. You know, I know there's always the risk it could go south. It could go your way. But would a non -- not taking anything away that should be resolved by the jury, but whatever the court can resolve -- and maybe there's nothing the court can resolve. Maybe that's just the way it is. And this is an evolving situation in the courts, and maybe there is nothing the court could really do and it all should just go to the jury. And that's fine.

But I guess my question is: Would there be a possible favorability to Apple, and also would it help possibly Apple resolve the matter without the need of a

full-blown infringement-validity-damage jury trial?

MR. MUELLER: So, if I could take that in parts, your Honor. Our major position is advanced in the briefing -- and we believe it's the right answer -- is that a pre-jury trial bench trial wouldn't advance the merits and actually could lead to some inefficiencies, and let me explain why.

You're a hundred percent right that the FRAND issues in this case are important issues to the parties. They're important issues beyond this case, and there's a lot happening in the law. So, there's no question these are important issues. And there is also an important role for the court to play, and I'll get to that in a few moments.

But I would say equally important in this case are the basic patent merits. And even though there are FRAND issues in this case and those issues are significant, the starting point for this case are the patent allegations made by Core Wireless and our defenses to those allegations; and this is not a case in which we are -- you know, the parties are inevitably going to move towards rate setting. You know, we feel very strongly that their allegations are wrong and that we're going to prevail on liability. And if we do, this is a moot point. All of these FRAND questions, the rate-setting

issues, you name it, will not be live issues if, as we hope and expect, we prevail on the merits.

So, in that sense this is like every other patent case that your Honor has. The merits are critical, and we think that we need to proceed towards those merits on the current schedule and try the case.

Depending on what happens in that merits phase, we think there could be some other proceedings -- and I'm happy to talk to you about our thoughts on ways those could be framed -- that follow the merits proceeding. But the merits proceeding is the threshold hurdle that the parties need to clear; and if they can't clear that hurdle, the case is over. And we think they can't. So, that's the first thing.

The second thing is the role of the court.

There's a couple pieces to that. Before the jury trial takes place -- and we hope it takes place as scheduled, in January -- we've asked your Honor and we've moved for Daubert and that will be heard and that's a very important motion that we think raises some critical issues for framing the case for the jury on FRAND damages.

We will request from your Honor jury instructions that reflect the law in this area, and that also is going to be quite important for structuring the

trial for the jury. So, those are all important functions that we will ask your Honor to play for that jury trial in January.

But there's more as well. Once that jury trial ends, if there were any liability -- and again, we hope and expect there will not be -- there would be some additional questions. One would be whether your Honor thought there was no reasonable defense such that the first prong of the willfulness test were met and there could be some follow-on willfulness proceeding.

Second would be patent unenforceability. Now, Core Wireless mentioned this in its briefing; and we agree with them that unenforceability of a patent is an issue for the court. We think the evidence on that will substantially go in as part of the jury trial on the technical merits. There may be some additional evidence that your Honor would need to hear as part of a separate follow-on proceeding that could occur immediately after and wouldn't take very long at all. But much of the evidence would go in as part of the patent merits trial, and that would be an issue for your Honor as well.

So, the short of it is there are some important functions for the court to play before the jury trial. There are some issues the court would need to decide, perhaps, after the jury trial. But our position

is the jury trial needs to go first, both to see if this is even a live issue; and there is a second reason as well, your Honor. And the second reason is the valuation of the patents from a RAND perspective, issues like unenforceability, willfulness for sure. All of those issues will be substantially instructed for all of us by the evidence that goes in at the trial, and the notion that we could do some one-day proceeding this fall to set a FRAND rate we don't think is practically possible.

There's many aspects of the FRAND rate-setting process that turn entirely, or heavily, on the technical evidence. So, for example, were there available alternatives to the technologies that they say the patents covered, a hugely important issue for determining how much those patents are worth. If there were five ways to do it and there's no performance benefit to the one that the patents covered, that's going to mean a much lower value. You know, perhaps they could show a lack of non-infringing alternatives; that might go in the other direction. We would have to see. The point is the technical evidence is very important for setting a FRAND rate.

They mentioned the *Microsoft* case, the *Innovatio* cases. Those were substantial proceedings. The *Microsoft* case was an over-one-week bench trial.

Innovatio was collectively like ten days worth of testimony, including heavy testimony on the technical issues in the case.

So, we're not going to be able to do a short proceeding to set a FRAND rate and thereby help the jury. We think the proper course is to put the technical evidence in, have the jury -- if there is any liability at all -- decide damages, FRAND-instructed damages. And then if there's any remaining damages afterwards, that technical evidence and that trial record would inform the issues.

That's what happened in the *Ericsson* case, your Honor, where the jury heard the liability issues, the jury set FRAND damages; and then after that, there were some follow-on proceedings.

But we think both from the perspective of deciding whether these are even live issues at all and also the perspective of having the full record necessary to conduct the valuation analysis and the perspective of having the jury decide the issues the jury needs to decide, we go forward on the merits trial. We do it as scheduled. And the only question in our view is how do we structure any follow-on proceedings.

THE COURT: And, so, Mr. Mueller, I think I know the answer to this question; but your position is

there is not a role or a need for the court to be involved -- I understand your position -- pretrial but also post trial. In other words, Apple's position is that all of this should be resolved by the jury.

MR. MUELLER: That's basically correct, your Honor, in this sense. The jury should decide the damages like in any patent case. Now, they should have, we believe, instructions that reflect --

THE COURT: Appropriately instructed, right.

MR. MUELLER: Appropriately instructed.

We think they can decide the FRAND properly-instructed damages.

We also think the contract claims, which we would suggest could be staged after the patent merits trial, for reasons that I'm happy to explain -- but that breach of contract is a jury claim. Any damages on those claims, both on our claims or their claims, are jury questions; and a properly instructed jury could decide those issues as well.

THE COURT: All right. Well, just to wrap this up, I don't think it would be the court's preference to stage the infringement allegations and the breach of contract allegations. I think it would be the court's preference to -- if we're going to try it to the jury, we're going to try it to the same jury.

What's your position on that?

MR. MUELLER: So, I'd say this on that, your Honor. We could do and would suggest the most efficient course would be to have that patent merits trial. If there's no liability, I can't imagine how the contract claims they've brought could possibly go forward at that point. The gist of the claims is that Apple is not negotiating in good faith for the patents-in-suit. If there is no infringement or they are invalid, that claim would seem to be dead. So, there's no need for the jury to decide it if that's their finding.

If, however, they were to find liability on one or more of the patents, the jury could be held over to decide those contract issues in a short second stage. Now, here's the reason why we think that's appropriate, your Honor. There's going to be -- and you'll hear more about this, I'm sure, over the next few months -- some very tricky evidentiary questions on the contract claims in particular; and Core Wireless alluded to some of them in their briefing.

I take it that they intend to put in front of the jury certain correspondence they've marked Rule 408. And there is a dispute, I think -- or at least uncertainty -- as to which of the correspondence between the parties and discussions between the parties would be

408 protected which might be subject to a mediation privilege pursuant to the court's mediation proceedings. There are some very difficult issues along the admissibility lines.

In addition, there's prejudice issues. You know, we think the jury should decide liability with a focus on the patent claims being applied to the accused products and the prior art, period, and not have, you know, tainting their view of those core merits any side issues involving correspondence between the parties. That's exactly what Rule 408 is intended to prevent.

And, so, these evidentiary questions which are difficult don't need to be addressed in the patent merits phase; and they may be moot entirely if we went on liability. But if we didn't, we could hold the jury over and do a short follow-on proceeding on any residual contract claims. And, again, that's very similar to what happened in the *Ericsson* case. The jury was held over after the initial determination.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Okay. Let me hear -- Mr. Bunsow, let me ask you a couple of questions. There's obviously no agreement among the parties as far as a pretrial proceeding here; so, if the court does not proceed with a pre-jury trial bench trial, I believe you've indicated to

me in earlier proceedings that your position -- and perhaps it's evolved -- would be that a jury trial would be appropriate on these FRAND issues that we've been talking about.

My question, I guess, is -- as to Mr. Mueller, the same thing I'm going to ask you -- is there a post jury trial role/function for the court to play on these FRAND issues or damage issues; or should it, if you don't get a pretrial bench trial, just go to the jury? What's your position on that?

MR. BUNSOW: So, I think what Mr. Mueller is suggesting is really putting the cart before the horse in this particular situation. They alluded in their filing of yesterday to some comments that I made previously. I've got that transcript. But if you look at it, what I was talking about was the portfolio situation. We're litigating eight patents in this case. Does that mean we have a follow-on trial of eight more and we have a follow-on trial of eight more? This was on the motion whether or not to go forward with our counterclaim for a portfolio license. That's what those comments were directed to.

And our thinking is evolving on this.

Absolutely. But as we look at the trial, I think you have to say, "Okay. What does this trial look like?"

Mr. Mueller wants a determination on the merits and a January trial. I agree. Let's get a determination on the merits of the patent issues in a manageable trial in January.

The question is what is the potential impact of, in particular, the ETSI contract issue; so, let me give you an example. Apple claims that, for a couple of reasons, we did not comply with our ETSI obligation and, therefore, the patents are unenforceable.

Why have a jury trial, present that evidence to the jury when it's a legal determination, and then try to decide that post jury trial when it's exactly the type of issue that can be decided by the court in advance based on the interpretation of the ETSI rules? I mean, that's a legal determination. There are no factual disputes about that. We did what we did when we did it. No factual disputes whatsoever.

And the question is, for the court, under the ETSI rules what's the result of that. Do we lose our right to enforce the patents or not? A jury can't decide that. A jury is not going to be tasked with deciding what the ETSI language means. That's exactly the antithesis of what jury trials are all about. So, that's the first thing that we believe should be decided before any jury trial and can be done by the court in a very

efficient way and clear that out and help make the jury trial manageable.

The contrary -- the other side of that, of course, is our claim that Apple has not complied with its obligations as a member of ETSI and that that has two impacts. Most dramatic for the jury trial is that it does not allow Apple to claim a FRAND royalty rate anymore. So, it has a direct impact on the damages consideration by the jury. Is the jury going to be told at trial that they're limited to a FRAND determination? That's what Apple would have the court do.

But if we do a post-trial hearing on Apple's FRAND and ETSI obligations, that will nullify the jury verdict if we win and it turns out that Apple is not entitled to FRAND damages.

So, those two issues should be decided in advance of trial. They should be decided so that the court can frame the issues appropriately for the jury clearly.

We have gone on to explain why other aspects of -- other issues in the case should be decided as well, primarily because there are simply no disputed factual issues about them. But, you know, we all agree that the FRAND issues are important. Apple has pleaded that the FRAND issues are determinative on liability. We have

pleaded that the FRAND and ETSI issues are determinative on at least damages and possibly remedies, opening Apple up to potential injunctive relief, which is also for the court. So, it makes no sense to us to present all of that in the context of what is otherwise a straightforward patent infringement case when it should be decided in advance by the court.

You can't do it afterwards because you would have to reset what the jury had already done. So, basically if you decide afterwards that Apple is not entitled to a FRAND determination, then we're going to have to have another damages trial. You'd have to set aside the jury verdict and have another damages trial.

So, that's why we've proposed that the court take these legal issues. They're very focused. I think they're very manageable, and I think we could do it in one day with the appropriate briefing.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that's your position and I appreciate that and it's something to look at. But what do I do with the fact that Apple doesn't agree to a pretrial determination such as you're talking about?

MR. BUNSOW: Well, two answers to that. First of all, these are pure legal determinations for the court; and I don't think Apple has any say in that. If

it's a legal determination for the court, then you can scream for a jury trial all you want; you're not entitled to a jury trial, constitutionally or otherwise.

THE COURT: Well, and that seems to be where the disconnect is between the parties here; and maybe that's what I need to get you to specifically brief is.

MR. BUNSOW: Sure. So, let's look at what the jury trial would look like as Apple proposes it.

THE COURT: What I need to understand from you, Mr. Bunsow, is you say they're legal issues. If they're purely legal issues that's for the court to resolve, specifically identify what those are and then let me get Apple to respond to that.

MR. BUNSOW: Sure.

THE COURT: If it's as you're saying, that they're not entitled to a jury trial on this, and it's as you described, then perhaps I agree that a pretrial determination of those issues would be appropriate such that the jury can appropriately assess damages such that we would not have to come back and have another jury trial, depending on what the court found. So, identify for me specifically what the legal issues are here and let me get Apple to respond to that.

MR. BUNSOW: Okay. So, on Apple's claim it's based on the explicit wording of the ETSI regulations.

Nokia and Core are both members of ETSI. They made declarations, including the patents-in-suit, at particular times. So, what the court will be asked to decide is what those regulations mean legally. That is not a question to be submitted to the jury. The regulations say what they say; and to what extent they impose legal obligations is for the court, not for the jury. This is just like interpreting a statute, for example.

On the flip side of that is Apple's obligation as a member of ETSI, which is also specifically determined with reference to the ETSI regulations. So, the court will be asked, as a matter of law, to determine the nature and extent of Apple's obligation as a member of ETSI who seeks to take advantage of the FRAND benefit that comes with that membership.

So, these obligations are based on the ETSI written documents that have been in place for many years and the interpretation of those written documents. Those are not factual issues. Those are not disputed issues. Those are issues of law.

THE COURT: All right. Let me have Mr. Mueller respond to that.

MR. MUELLER: Sure. There may be some room for agreement on these issues if what I heard as the

legal issues that would be presented to your Honor -- if I understand that correctly.

Now, I'm not sure this would require a bench trial; and, in fact, I don't think it does. But if we're talking about some pure questions of law, these, in fact, may be some of the things that we had in our briefing in different parts -- I know there's a lot of briefing that went in to your Honor -- in the letter briefing on requests for summary judgment. And we might be able to pull out of that certain issues that seem to be at the crux of what they are seeking and have, you know, some form of summary judgment hearing essentially on the legal questions, on the legal questions alone.

That may be something that we can all agree to and have your Honor conduct it and, you know, rule on that before the January trial. So, let me see if I can take my best crack at distilling what was said.

I think there were two arguments made as to the implications of Core Wireless' contract claims for the jury trial; and they were, first, that if they are right about the ETSI obligations, that could somehow result in them being released from their FRAND commitments for damages purposes and that the jury would no longer need to be instructed on the FRAND obligations.

We think as a matter of law, that's just clearly wrong. No case has ever said that. I'm not aware of a shred of authority to support that; and we would be very happy to have your Honor decide that legal question before the jury trial, whether the ETSI obligations could somehow be discharged in the way that they are suggesting. That is a legal question, we agree, and certainly one we would be happy and pleased to brief to your Honor.

The second was injunctions, the notion that somehow their contract claims could result in their being able to seek an injunction. We think as a matter of law, there is absolutely no way, as a nonpracticing entity asserting FRAND-committed patents that didn't even request an injunction in their pleadings, they should be allowed to seek an injunction. And, again, we would be happy to deal with that on the briefs to your Honor as a matter of law.

So, those are two concrete legal issues -whether they could be discharged from their FRAND
commitment for purposes of damages and whether they could
conceivably seek an injunction -- that we would be, as I
said, pleased to brief to your Honor and have your Honor
decide as a matter of law before the jury trial.

The other issue that was mentioned was

unenforceability as a consequence of our contract claims. I think actually it's a consequence of some of our equitable defenses that we've pleaded. And we agree those are issues for your Honor. I don't think, however, they could be dealt with before the jury trial because they deal with the patents being untimely disclosed to standard-setting organizations; and there is just factual evidence that would need to come in as part of the technical testimony.

For example, there's going to need to be testimony on working groups at ETSI that considered various proposals and the chronology by which they did so. Those are very much factual questions that your Honor would need to have a record on before rendering a judgment on unenforceability. Also note those are our defenses, and we're not asking your Honor to decide those now.

I think with respect to the claims they've presented, the two arguments I heard as to how those claims could impact the jury trial are, first, releasing them from their FRAND commitment and, second, this possibility of seeking an injunction. And we think as a matter of law, both of those positions are incorrect and positions that your Honor could resolve prior to the jury trial.

So, if those are the issues on the table, we agree; but I think the appropriate vehicle would be some form of dispositive motion briefing as opposed to a bench trial.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Bunsow, response?

MR. BUNSOW: Well, it sounds like we've got

partial agreement; and that's a step in the right

direction. As to the Apple defense of unenforceability,

it is based entirely on supposed late disclosure. There

is no dispute as to when disclosures were made. As we

pointed out in our memorandum to the court, this is not a

new theory by Apple. They have tried it in two other

cases, and They have lost it in both of those other

cases.

So, I think my concern expressed earlier that we should not go through a full-blown jury trial when we have a legal issue of enforceability, yea or nay, that could be decided by the court, only to give Apple another bite after the jury trial on whether or not they're liable.

So, all three of those issues should be decided before the trial, including Apple's, as Mr. Mueller conceded, equitable defense. It's an equitable defense. Equitable defenses are tried to the court. That's *Hornbook* law.

So, I think if --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bunsow, to the point, though, that Mr. Mueller has raised several times -- and I think the typical practice from the court, of course, would be, as to unenforceability, that that be developed during the course of the trial, that record.

Now, that testimony that is not appropriately submitted in front of the jury, that could be heard on a post-trial basis as a supplement to the record developed at the jury trial with this being outside the presence of the jury; and then the court can make determinations based upon that. I think that's typically appropriate.

So, I think that to the extent we're talking about developing things that would typically be done in a jury record, I think that's their point. So, I guess, you know, if we're starting to go in those areas, then --

MR. BUNSOW: I understand their --

THE COURT: -- perhaps that would not be the best route to go.

MR. BUNSOW: I understand their point and I understand your point and I've been there, done that. And typically this arises with an inequitable conduct defense, and inequitable conduct defenses are very factually intensive. And that record is developed during the course of the trial in terms of who said what

to the Patent Office and when and all those sorts of things.

But this is different. This is an accusation by Apple that a disclosure that was not made by a particular time renders the patent unenforceable. This is a pure legal issue, again, based on the ETSI regulations just like our claims are based on the ETSI regulations, in fact, maybe even more so because they deal directly with disclosure obligations which are clearly set forth in the ETSI obligations.

So, it's really a very narrow legal issue. It's not the type of factual issue that comes up in an inequitable conduct defense where evidence will be taken outside the jury during the course of the trial. It's really much different than that, and I think you have to look at the evidence that -- the supposed evidence that will be presented.

So, what is Apple going to present to the jury in terms of its unenforceability defense? Well, they're going to present copies of the ETSI rules. Now, that's not something for the jury to interpret. They're going to present presumably Mr. Palmer to say, "I'm an expert in French law, and these rules mean thus-and-so." That's not a determination for the jury.

Those are determinations for the court, and

all of these ETSI obligations should be determined in the same package because the court is going to have to dig into those ETSI rules to determine any of them anyway. They're all legal issues. They should all be determined at the same time in advance of the trial. It's very different than the inequitable conduct enforceability type of defense.

MR. MUELLER: Just a couple of words, your Honor?

THE COURT: Okay. Yes.

MR. MUELLER: Just briefly, your Honor, a couple of points. The unenforceability record on these untimely disclosure issues would be something that would need to be factually developed as part of the full trial. That said, there could be some piece that would be heard outside the jury's earshot but it certainly can be done as part of a jury proceeding and I've actually tried these types of questions before to juries and there was no procedural impediment to doing so.

But I definitely take Mr. Bunsow's point that there could be some piece of that that your Honor should hear separate from the jury; and we think that's true for other claims in the case as well, that the first jury trial -- the jury trial in chief, so to speak -- shouldn't have all of the issues be part of it.

I mentioned this earlier, your Honor. But the contract claims, even if those were to ultimately be decided by the jury, those raise evidentiary questions that the jury in deciding the first merits case shouldn't hear. And if I could be more concrete, they are claiming that the course of correspondence between the parties and offers made and received -- some of which were made pursuant to mediation, some of which were made pursuant to Rule 408 -- should come in and be heard by the jury.

Now, to the extent Apple were to make an offer, that could color the jury's view of the merits and be highly prejudicial to their consideration of the core liability issues. We don't think that's appropriate. We think the jury should decide the patent merits based on the patent merits and not be tainted by evidence that they shouldn't hear.

So, I do think that there is going to need to be some staging of the proceedings; and perhaps as part of that, we could have any unenforceability evidence that only your Honor should hear received by your Honor after the jury has heard the merits case and decided the merits issues.

I don't think this would result in anything cumbersome or hard to pull off. We're talking about an extra day or two tacked onto the end of the jury trial

where either they would be held over after they rendered their initial verdict for one more day's worth of testimony and/or your Honor would hear some additional testimony bearing on the bench issues. But that would set up a process whereby we would first get a full record and a decision on the threshold issues, which could end the whole thing. It could all be over at that point. But if it's not, the residual jury issues, including those that relate to evidence that really shouldn't be heard as part of the first trial, or the residual bench issues, could be efficiently and quickly taken up at the end; and we think that's the best way to do it.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Anything else?

MR. BUNSOW: I just want to make a practical point, your Honor. What Apple is proposing is decide all of Core's issues that may impact Apple -- whether they're entitled to FRAND, what their relief might be, whether they've breached their obligation -- in advance of the jury trial. We're in favor of that.

But Step 2 is let's put all of Apple's defenses in with the patent merits. Let's mix it all up in with the patent merits so that the jury not only has to consider a very technical patent case but now has to consider ETSI regulations, timing of disclosures.

Mr. Mueller alluded to meetings and technical discussions and all of those sorts of things. That has the risk of overwhelming a jury determination on the merits. We're all in favor of a jury determination on the merits. It's impractical.

The third problem is until Apple's equitable defense of unenforceability is determined, there is likely no chance of resolving this case. That is something that they have been pushing. They've pushed it in two other cases, unsuccessfully in those two other cases. It was held against them in those two other cases.

They're trying to make a law that they can latch onto in terms of ETSI disclosures for this case and for other cases. Fair enough. You know, I'd be doing the same thing. But the fact of the matter is the ETSI rules are subject to legal interpretation. There are no factual disputes about the disclosures. They occurred when they occurred. They're matters of record. They're matters of ETSI record. There is no dispute about that. So, that needs to be determined as well.

There is no way that the jury should decide those, and it makes no sense to burden the jury record with it. It will just muck up the jury case, for lack of a better phrase. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. MUELLER: May I be heard?

Respectfully, your Honor, we agree the first jury trial should be kept as simple as possible. And to the extent that there's pieces of the unenforceability case that could be sequenced after they render their verdict on the core merits, we're in favor of that, your Honor. We very much want to have an understandable patent merits case decided first.

THE COURT: Well, let me say this. You know, I am in no way trying to take anything away from a jury. I think, you know, juries and this jury that will be impaneled in this trial will do an excellent job. They are going to try their best. They are perfectly -- they handle complex cases around this country every day. They are perfectly capable of doing it.

I'm also not intending and not desiring to take anything away from a jury that should be decided by a jury. That's fine. That is the way our system works and the way it's going to work here in this case.

All I'm just exploring are the possibility of somewhat streamlining things for counsel, the parties, and the jury; looking at the possibility, if there are legal issues, of perhaps handling those in a pretrial manner or also exploring post-trial manner to, as I say,

help streamline that trial; also perhaps help the parties resolve the matter without the expense perhaps of a full-blown jury trial which, again, if that's what the parties want, that's perfectly fine and we'll try it and you'll have your answer.

So, that's all I'm trying to do. I'm perfectly confident in a jury. They can handle it. They handle complex civil and criminal cases all over the country every day, and they'll do it absolutely fine here.

I'm also not trying to take any jury issue away at all. We're going to try this case to a jury. That's fine. The two goals are perhaps helping resolve things one way or the other and getting some answers, some structure to what the jury is being asked to do without perhaps, you know, putting things in that they just -- it's not for them to decide. Not that they couldn't decide it; it's just not for them and would help them and help the counsel to structure their cases more clearly for the jury.

All right. I'm going to take about a five- or ten-minute recess and then we'll come back and I may have some orders for you to comply with. We'll be in recess about ten minutes.

(Recess, 10:15 a.m. to 10:34 a.m.)

(Open court, all parties present.)

THE COURT: All right. What I'm going to do is -- in the discussion this morning there appears to be, I believe, some agreement here that there are certain perhaps, I'll say, "narrow" issues that the court can -- perhaps needs to resolve, it appears, you know, characterized as "legal issues."

What I'm going to order the parties to do is -- based on what we've talked about today is to meet and confer and by August 15th submit to the court issues the parties can agree to -- agree that are legal issues. Set those out for me. Here's the issue for the court. Okay? That's one. I want you to submit that by August 15th.

Number 2, I want you to submit to me basically your findings, your conclusions the court needs to make on that issue, obviously characterized as you believe the court should resolve it, proposed findings and conclusions. So, here's the issue. Here's Core's findings and conclusions how it should come out, and here's Apple's. Here is the next one. Set those out for me.

What I would also like you to do is, on the same date -- now, the extent of this -- there may be some flexibility on this; but what I want is with those issues

submitted, with the proposed findings and conclusions submitted, that each party submit to me their jury instructions and the verdict form that is related to those issues.

Now, that may not have to be at this point. It believe the jury instruction deadline is October 31st. It may not have to be -- it's not your full jury instructions. It's not -- perhaps doesn't have to be your full RAND instructions, but how it would look if -- say the court resolves the legal questions in Core's favor; and, so, then Core will propose these jury instructions.

Now, I know if the court resolved it against you, it might be different; but I just want to see what each side's proposed instructions are based on an affirmative -- a favorable finding on this particular legal issue.

Now, if you can, I would like to see your full FRAND instructions and verdict form. Now, August 15th may be -- I'll give you some more time on that, but I'd like to go ahead and see this as soon as possible.

I think what I will do is this. I'll give you the option to give me those jury instructions and verdict form by August 15th that pertain to these legal issues.

If that's more limited than full FRAND instructions,

that's fine. But I'd like the full FRAND instructions by the end of this month, by August 31st. I think that would help me go ahead and start looking at it and get my mind oriented on where the parties are going with this.

Now, I know this is somewhat kind of up in the air; and I'm not locking anybody into anything. But I think for y'all to sit down and identify some legal issues you can agree to, tell me what each party's position on those are, and also go ahead and sit down and see where you can agree on FRAND issues and where you can -- y'all sit down and look at that and let me look at it, I think would be helpful.

Now, I think we've narrowed -- I brought y'all here today to discuss this FRAND obligation, FRAND issues. I think we've narrowed it substantially to maybe some legal issues that the court may be able to resolve and might help the parties. But I think we're sort of at an early stage here, and I just want to get those identified after you talk. I want to get your positions on those particular issues, and then I want to get your jury instructions based on where you think the court should go on those legal issues.

All right. Any questions from the plaintiff?

MR. BUNSOW: I believe that at least as we sit

here today, we have a situation where Core is amenable to having some of those issues determined that Apple wants determined. Apple is not amenable to having ETSI issues determined that Core wants to have determined. It puts us in a bit of a situation.

THE COURT: Well -- and here's what I'm saying. I want the parties to see if they can agree on something. If you can't agree on it, then, you know, we'll deal with it down the road. But I'm talking about things you can agree on.

Now, there's going to come a point, if there are legal issues, the court is going to have to resolve them some way.

MR. BUNSOW: Right.

THE COURT: And that's going to be pretrial or post trial, somewhere along the way. I want to just, you know -- I don't know how this will turn out. I don't know what the court's next step will be. I will say that I am wanting to resolve these so-called "legal issues" on a matter where I give the parties -- I want live testimony on these. I want to see the experts. I want to give you an opportunity to present to me -- if there is a fact witness that's got some bearing on this issue, I want to hear from them.

So, I don't know what the next step will be;

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but I want y'all to try to agree -- and, Mr. Bunsow, if
you feel that's the way this is going and you don't want
to agree -- but I will say it may be beneficial for each
side to sit down and, no matter when you think it needs
to be resolved, if it's a legal issue, identify it.
           MR. BUNSOW:
                        Right.
           THE COURT: And, you know, if you think
it's -- you just tell me, "Legal issue:
                                         Core says
pretrial; Apple says post trial."
           MR. BUNSOW:
                        Right.
           THE COURT:
                       Just give me that and then give me
what your -- "and the court should resolve this this way
because one, two, three."
           MR. BUNSOW:
                        Right.
           THE COURT: Apple says, "No. You should
resolve it this way because one, two, three.
                                              This
evidence shows this. This evidence shows this.
evidence shows this."
           MR. BUNSOW:
                        Right.
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THE COURT: And then I'll look and see how to approach it from there.

MR. BUNSOW: That's fair. We're happy to engage in the process, and we just want to make sure it's a two-way street.

> THE COURT: Okay. All right.

Mr. Mueller?

MR. MUELLER: Just briefly, your Honor.

I think we're going to be able to reach some common ground on these issues. You know, we're certainly going to do our best to find issues that we can bring before your Honor to resolve. And I think I've heard today some candidates, and we'll continue to mull over some others as well.

Just a couple quick logistical questions if I could, your Honor. On the 13th -- I'm sorry -- the 15th, the date the 15th, those submissions, as I understand it, would be limited to those areas where we decide jointly that your Honor should decide certain questions and, on those issues we agree on, put in proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and perhaps our suggestions on our process for adjudicating them. But we would not also be including issues that we have not reached agreement on; is that right?

THE COURT: Yes. My intention had been for y'all to agree on issues. Now, you know, I mean, at the risk of expanding this, you know, it may be that if one side says, "Well, here's a legal issue that should be resolved by the court" and the other side says "No," it may be good for me to see that, too.

You know, I think that the way -- I think what

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we'll do is we'll limit this to issues the parties can agree on at this point. Now, again, I think, you know, if there are other issues that the parties have disagreement on, then the court is going to have to resolve that at some point. I think most likely that will be done as a matter of what will be submitted to the jury, a matter of jury instructions and jury questions; and then that may have to be resolved on a post-trial basis if the court decides it's a legal issue.

to make a determination on it pretrial.

But I think -- the focus of what I'm trying to get at here is what y'all have talked about today. There seemed to be some agreement, and I want y'all to try to

Conversely, if we get down to it at pretrial and there is

an issue the parties can't agree on, the court may have

agree and submit those -- as I say, identify those if it's pretrial or post trial. Let me know the parties' positions on that, but just that statement and then how

the parties think it should come out.

MR. MUELLER: Fair enough.

And in that submission on the 15th, would it be appropriate if we did it in sort of letter briefing format to your Honor?

THE COURT: No, do it as a filing. I want it,
you know, a joint submission pursuant to the court's

order of August 1st. And then, as I say, just identify agreed legal issues. Tell me what stage each party thinks or, if there is agreement, when it should be resolved and then just a brief, "Here is the way the court should come out on it, and here is why."

And I want it, you know, really pared down.

This is just a notice to the court. It's not your evidentiary briefing and not your evidentiary submission.

But I just want to get a brief sort of proposed, "Here is the way the court should find, and here is briefly why."

MR. MUELLER: Understood.

Last question, your Honor. So, for the end of the month, I understand, your Honor, that we should be submitting FRAND jury instructions and verdict form. And just so we're clear, as we envision the jury instructions that would be given at the merits trial, those would bear on damages. There's a separate and, I think, more complicated question about what to do with these contract claims. You know, for reasons that we've explained in prior briefing -- I won't belabor them today -- we don't think there is any, you know, legal theory that supports some of what they're pleading.

But in any event, it's a much more complicated set of issues. There is the evidentiary questions we talked about, including the mediation and 408 issues. I

would respectfully suggest, your Honor, that we limit the 31st to the jury instructions that would be appropriate in the patent merits and damages trial; and then we could take up, perhaps in the October 3rd submission, any other issues.

THE COURT: I think that's fine. I mean, I'm just wanting to, you know, get sort of a general feel and flavor for how each party is presenting this, where the disputes are. It doesn't have to be comprehensive. You know, there are probably some issues the court is going to have to resolve down the road.

But I want on the 15th jury instructions that pertain to what we're talking about, these legal issues; and then the 31st is a more broad damages submission.

Again, I'm not locking anybody in. I just want to see where the parties are going on this.

MR. MUELLER: Understood. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BUNSOW: May I just make one point, your line and the state of the

When you first described the 15th and the 31st, what I thought you were doing was saying let's use the submission on the 31st to see what the jury trial would look like if these issues are included in the jury

trial. And I think that's a useful exercise because I think it would be very enlightening to see what these issues look like if they are going to be presented to the jury.

What I just heard Mr. Mueller suggest is that the filing on the 31st would not include those issues, and I don't think that's a useful exercise. Why would we submit merits-based damage instructions? I mean, you can look at the form book and get those.

What I want to see is what Apple's instructions look like when they're saying that the patents are unenforceable, what ours look like when we say that Apple is not entitled to a FRAND rate anymore. I think those would help the court.

MR. MUELLER: If I could, your Honor, I think what I understood was on the 15th we'd spell out here's the issue. Here's why we think we're right. Here's why they think they're right, and then here's the implication of that issue in terms of the structure of the proceedings to follow.

That may take the form of jury instructions.

For unenforceability I don't think there would necessarily be a jury instruction, but we could still spell out here is the implication of it. And I think that would be a useful exercise. You know, we would say

here is the issue, here is our position, and here is the affect if we're right, if they're right.

THE COURT: Well, look, all I'm saying is I just want -- on the 15th if you can agree to some legal issues, I want you to identify those; and then I want the jury instructions, how they would look based upon the court's determination, say in Core's favor on those issues or in Apple's favor, what would it look like. On the 31st I'm broadening that out to more of just a generalized here's how it would -- each side is going to propose jury instructions look.

I'll leave it to y'all on, you know, the specifics of that. I'm not trying to get down to that level of detail at this point. But I do think the more, the better for the court to understand and for the parties to understand. I think everybody knows what each party's position is. It's just a matter of articulating that in a jury instruction.

So, yes, I mean, I want those submitted to the -- I mean, if Apple's position is these need to be developed in a jury trial record, you submit those instructions the way you're going to propose them, the way they're going to look. So, don't hold back. The 31st is the full breadth.

Now, if there is some reason why you don't

want to submit something, you know, we'll take that up; but --

MR. MUELLER: Yeah. And that makes perfect sense, your Honor. The only point I was making is on the 31st, as I understand your Honor, that would be the jury instructions -- the full set of FRAND-related jury instructions for this merits trial; and I think there still are substantial questions that are going to take longer than that to figure out about any follow-on proceedings on contract claims and the rest. That's all I'm saying.

THE COURT: If that's Apple's position -- I'm just talking about if Apple's position is we should be resolving some things in a staged proceeding, then, you know -- well, Mr. Mueller, actually, you know, I really don't -- I think just submit everything on these damages issues. Just submit it all. Okay?

MR. MUELLER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I mean, if you think it's a staged proceeding, submit both stages. I want to see it all.

MR. MUELLER: Great.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MR. MUELLER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else from the plaintiff?

46 1 MR. BUNSOW: Thank you, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, and we're 3 adjourned. (Proceedings concluded, 10:50 a.m.) 4 COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 6 I, court approved transcriber, hereby certify on this date, August 11, 2014, that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled 10 matter. 11 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25